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International comparison of living standards is a central issue in economics. Rankings 
of per capita GDP are widely used for such comparisons. However, many problems 
arise since (i) countries use their own currencies, (ii) have their own price levels, and 
(iii) consumers’ preferences could differ across countries. These and other factors lead 
to biased estimation of national income. The present paper is part of a literature which 
intends to remedy such biases. 
 
Market exchange rates can be used for standardizing international incomes to a 
common measure, e.g. US dollars. This approach is simple to apply and widely used. 
However, even if the purchasing power parity doctrine (PPP) is assumed to hold for 
tradable goods, PPP may not hold for the prices of untradable goods converted by the 
market exchange rate. As a result, this approach turns out to be biased, because it 
ignores the price differences in non-tradables. In other words, it cannot give an 
accurate measure of differences in living standards across countries.  
  
This approach has been substantially improved by the introduction of the constant 
international price measure, which has been adopted by some countries since the 
1980’s. This method is employed by United Nations International Comparison Project 
(ICP), through the United Nations and the Commission of European Communities 
(1987). This commission provides ICP prices and quantities for 38 categories of 
expenditure across 60 countries. The Geary-Khamis (G-K) method is used to 
aggregate the quantities under international prices; thus, a PPP based measure is 
derived to compare real GDP in these countries. The ICP data have been further 
extended across countries and time by Summers and Heston (1991); the resulting  3
ranking is known as the Penn World Table (PWT). This measure can to some extent 
avoid the flaws brought about by the exchange-rate-based approach, because it 
ensures expenditures are calculated under the same price level. However, another 
problem arises: substitution bias. Particularly, higher expenditure on some 
commodities may be caused by a lower price level rather than higher income. Since 
this point cannot be reflected by constant international price measures, this approach 
could be utility-inconsistent and sensitive to the reference price vector. Moreover, this 
approach requires data with a high level of disaggregation, thus placing considerable 
demands on data collection. In fact, only 60 countries are involved in ICP (1987), 
while the incomes of non-benchmark countries are predicted through a regression 
model
4. This leads to a larger bias. Consequently, the development of unbiased 
measures of living standards is a key objective of the field of measurement 
economics. Such measures should be applicable to a majority of countries in the 
world and assist economic research and policy in a wide range of applications.   
 
The present paper is closely related to Dowrick and Akmal 2003 (henceforth referred 
to as DA). As observed by DA, Afriat
5  income can be calculated directly from 
detailed price data from the United Nations International Comparison Project (ICP), 
but only for benchmark country/year combinations. For these country/year 
combinations, DA find a log-linear relationship between foreign-exchange-rate-based 
(FX) income and Afriat income with a slope significantly different from one. The 
resulting parameter estimates can be used to estimate Afriat income for non-
                                                 
4This procedure was developed by Summers and Heston (1991). This paper suggests a method for 
estimating true incomes for non-benchmark countries, and thus opened up a new area in measurement 
economics. However, it lacks a theoretical foundation.  
5 The relevant references to Sydney Afriat’s work can be found in Dowrick and Quiggin (1994).  4
benchmark country/year combinations on the basis of observable FX income. Thus, 
DA point the way toward improved retroactive measurement of national income. 
 
The present paper focuses on the theoretical foundations of this relationship between 
the FX income, GK income and true (Afriat) income. DA use a model that arrives at a 
log-linear relationship between these income measures. The present paper employs an 
alternative model, which in contrast to DA’s model arrives at a full general 
equilibrium solution for the endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous variables. 
Using a Ricardian trade model with Cobb-Douglas preferences, the present paper 
generalizes several theoretical propositions from DA’s model. In our baseline model, 
we confine ourselves to the two-country case and ignore barriers to trade. An 
additional advantage of the model used in the present paper is that it can serve as the 
basis for a variety of extensions by adding certain features that may affect the 
relationship between FX income, GK income and true income.  
 
Some extensions of the Ricardian general equilibrium trade model are also employed. 
First, instead of modelling trade barriers that are considered in the traditional 
literature, such as transport costs and tariffs, we take into account distribution costs, 
ascribed to local distribution services, to measure the wedge between the prices of 
tradable goods. We also generalize the “Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect”, i.e. we 
allow that a rich country could have a lower price level than a poor country. In 
addition, the two countries become small open economies, trading in a global market 
under world prices. We then show that market exchange rates will overstate real 
international income gaps if and only if the price level of services is higher in the 
relatively rich country. On the other hand, constant price comparisons will overstate  5
true international income gaps if the constant price vector corresponds to that of a 
country where the productivity is lower (the poor country) and understate true 
international income gaps if the constant price vector corresponds to that of a country 
where the productivity is higher (the rich country), regardless of the price level of 
services. Based on this theoretical foundation, estimation of true (Afriat) GDP for 
non-benchmark countries could be improved, by adding other variables to the 
regression. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature. The baseline model is stated and the relevant 
propositions are derived in section 3. Some extensions are modeled in section 4. The 
empirical estimation of true (Afriat) GDP for non-benchmark countries is discussed in 
section 5. The final section summarizes the results and suggests the directions for 
further research. 
  
2. Literature review 
 
The bias of foreign-exchange-rate measures was noted by Balassa (1964), building on 
earlier work by Samuelson. This principal contribution focuses on non-traded goods 
to explain the differences in real exchange rates among countries. It suggests that if 
the international productivity gap is larger in traded goods than in non-traded goods, 
the purchasing power of the currency used in the country with higher productivity 
would be overestimated based on the market exchange rate. This proposition is 
explained by introducing a non-traded good to the traditional Ricardian trade model. 
With free trade, the prices for traded goods should be identical. However, the wage  6
rate of producers in the tradable goods sector should be different across countries 
because of differences in productivity and the wage rate in the traded goods sector 
will determine the wage rate in the non-traded goods sector, where the productivity 
difference is not as large. Therefore, the country with lower productivity has a lower 
price for non-traded goods and the average price is also lower. This explanation is 
interesting but it raises several problems: it is yet to be proven by general equilibrium 
analysis, and Balassa’s assumption of a single-factor production function is 
particularly unrealistic. We would also expect the productivity gap to be larger in the 
non-traded goods sector, which would result in very different implications. 
 
Bhagwati (1984) provides another explanation why services are cheaper in poor 
countries. He proposes a general equilibrium model with multi-factor production 
functions, which focuses on comparative endowments differences across countries, 
while Balassa (1964) is concerned with comparative productivity gaps. Bhagwati 
(1984) argues that even if productivity differences across sectors between countries 
are ignored, labor-intensive services are relatively cheaper in the poor country 
because poor countries seem to have lower capital labor ratios. Furthermore, he shows 
that countries with similar GDP per capita may violate the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) 
effect. It is one of the earliest papers to explain why the BS effect may be absent in 
certain samples of countries. 
 
The substitution bias of constant international price measures was in fact detected by 
ICP researchers. However, this kind of approach is still being used, probably because 
it is hard to construct an unbiased index, but also in part because unbiased indices 
may face a sub-aggregation problem. Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) illustrate  7
substitution bias by testing the detailed ICP price data set including 60 countries. The 
Samuelsonian revealed-preference approach is viewed as a basis for welfare 
comparisons. The basic idea is simple: if A can afford B’s consumption bundle at A’s 
prices while B cannot afford A’s bundle at B’s prices, then the wellbeing of A is 
greater than that of B. Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) show that constant price measures 
could be a reliable means for welfare comparisons between two countries with a large 
difference in living standards.  However, these rankings may not be in accordance 
with revealed-preference criteria if the two countries have similar levels of 
development. Additionally, these indices are sensitive to the reference price vector. 
For instance, if the relative price of one good in a country is lower than that in the 
reference price vector, it will lead to substitution towards this locally cheaper good 
and overestimation of the expenditure on this good.  
 
Although Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) demonstrate the substitution bias of constant 
international price measures, the paper’s discussion of theoretical foundations is 
limited, and it fails to construct an unbiased measure. Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) 
address this point and show that by applying the same data base as used in the ICP 
surveys, it is feasible to find an unbiased income index, which is utility-consistent and 
independent of the reference price or quantity vector, defined as the Afriat index. 
Seventeen OECD countries are selected from ICP data to construct this ideal index. It 
is found that ICP measures are often outside these bounds, which has further justified 
the existence of substitution bias in ICP income index. The finding of Afriat index 
represents another step forward in the measurement of national income. However, it is 
yet to be widely used so far. The reason may be that separate components of GDP, 
such as consumption and investment, cannot be obtained from this approach.   8
Dowrick and Akmal (2003) apply this ideal index to analyse the inequality in 
international income distribution. This paper also reveals that macroeconomic 
modelling can shed light on the relationship between the FX income, GK income and 
true (Afriat) income. Using a simple trade model of two countries, this paper explains 
that market exchange rates will overestimate the real international income gaps and a 
constant price comparison will underestimate the real income gaps if the reference 
price vector corresponds to a relatively rich country. Using the unbiased Afriat 
income measure, real-world inequality between countries is shown to have barely 
changed over time. Thus the marked increase in global inequality indicated by the FX 
measure and the marked decrease indicated by the GK measure are both spurious. In 
addition, to avoid the pitfall that Afriat incomes for non-benchmark countries cannot 
be calculated directly from ICP data, Dowrick and Akmal (2003) run a regression 
based on their theoretical model, which reflects the log-linear relationship between 
Afriat income and FX income.
6 Using this relationship, they estimate the true income 
for non-benchmark countries. 
 
However, their trade model does not provide a general equilibrium solution. With an 
endogenous trade pattern, there should be at least three cases, including complete 
specialization by both countries and one country specializing while the other does not. 
Our alternative trade model will yield a unique general equilibrium solution. We will 
also generalize and confirm several of Dowrick and Akmal’s (2003) theoretical 
results. In addition, our model paves the way for further extensions.  Other factors 
influencing the relationship between the FX income, GK income and true (Afriat) 
                                                 
6 This regression model constitutes an improvement over the procedure by Summers and Heston (1991) 
in that it has a theoretical basis. However, a lot more could be done to improve the macroeconomic 
model.  9
income could be considered, making the theoretical foundation more realistic, more 
meaningful, and empirically applicable.   
 
Several extensions are modeled in the present paper. In the previous literatures, it is 
usually assumed that PPP holds for traded goods because of free trade. However, 
evidence shows that relative PPP does not hold for tradable goods (Isard 1977, 
Giovannini 1988), and Engel (1999) finds that changes in prices of tradable goods can 
explain the most part of the movements in the US real exchange rate. Most 
economists are inclined to attribute this fact to trade barriers, which can cause a price 
wedge between countries. However, Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2002) argue that 
trade barriers are not the main reason for the price difference. They find that 
distribution costs constitute a large part of the consumer’s basket, representing more 
than 40% of the retail price of the average consumer good in the US and about 60% in 
Argentina. They further suggest that because distribution services are labor-intensive 
and labor is untradable, a wedge between the prices of tradable goods in different 
countries may occur. Therefore, the model can be improved by addressing distribution 
costs, as is done in the present paper. 
 
Secondly, preceding papers usually assume that the service sector has the same 
productivity in different countries so the price level of services will be higher in the 
rich country. However, as shown by Bhagwati (1984), no formal theory can show that 
non-traded sectors have productivity parity. Besides, Bergin, Glick and Taylor (2004) 
imply that if the technology gap is larger in the non-traded sector, then the price level 
in a poor country will be higher than a rich country. We incorporate this idea in the 
present paper by endogenizing the BS effect.  10
 
In addition, previous papers consider a world with only two countries. In part 4 of this 
paper, the two countries are assumed to be small open economies, trading in a global 
market under world prices. This assumption may be more realistic and also 
generalizes the pattern of trade. 
 
3. The baseline model 
 
3a. The baseline model’s assumptions and conventions 
Consider a world with two countries, 1 and 2; three goods, A, B and S; and only one 
factor of production, labor, denoted L. Production functions are assumed to have fixed 
coefficients. Units of A, B and S are standardized so that the fixed coefficients in 
country 1 are all equal to 1. Furthermore, both countries are assumed to be equally 
productive in S. Letting  ij L denote country i’s labor input into the production of good 
j, and  ij Y  country i’s output of good j, we thus have 
11 11 11 22 ,,,     AA BB SS S S YL YL YL YL ==== . 
A and B are traded while S, which can be thought of as locally provided services, is 
nontradable. Country 2 is assumed to have an absolute advantage in A and B, and a 
comparative advantage in B. This can be expressed as follows, letting  j λ λ λ λ  denote 
country 2’s fixed labor productivity coefficient in output j: 
22 22 ,, 1    AA ABB B BA YL YL λλ λ λ λλ λ λ λλ λ λ λλ λ λ == > > . 
 
Producers and consumers are assumed to be profit- and utility-maximizers 
respectively. Labor is assumed to be perfectly immobile internationally but perfectly  11
mobile between domestic sectors, so that wages are equalized intersectorally but not 
internationally. The labor market and all other markets are assumed to be in a long-
run perfectly competitive equilibrium. Thus full employment obtains: 
;1 , 2 ; , ,    ij i
j
L Li j A B S == = ∑ . Country i  (=1,2)  is assumed to be inhabited by  i L  
persons with internationally identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions; letting  ij c  
denote per capita consumption of good j, 
1 ;0 , 0 , 1 ; 1 , 2    ii A i B i S Uc c c i
αβ α β αβ α β αβ α β αβ α β αβα β αβα β αβα β αβα β
−− => > + < = . 
 
For the time being, we assume zero transportation costs and no barriers to trade. The 
structural equations provided so far completely describe the model. Taking country 1 
labor to be the numeraire, so that the wage rate there,  1 w , satisfies  1 1 w ≡ , we are 
ready to solve this general equilibrium model. 
 
3b0. The 3 relevant cases 
The case where both countries incompletely specialize can be ruled out.  Letting p 
denote the terms of trade, the domestic price ratios are equalized through trade: 
11 22 // AB AB p pp pp ≡= . Because domestic producers face different rates of 
transformation in each country,  / 1 BA λλ λλ λλ λλ >  (where 1 is the rate of transformation in 
country 1), there exists no p such that an interior point in () , AB YY   space can be 
optimal in both countries simultaneously. Thus one of the following 3 trade patterns 
must apply: 
Case 1: Country 1 specializes in A, while country 2 produces both A and B; 
Case 2: Country 2 specializes in B, while country 1 produces both A and B; 
Case 3: Country 1 specializes in A, and country 2 specializes in B.  12
 
In addition to goods A and B, both countries produce positive amounts of S in any 
equilibrium, due to the Cobb-Douglas preferences. Because  ; 1,2   iS i pw i == , per 
capita consumption of services always equals  1 iS c α β α β α β α β =− − . Our solution strategy is 
to first solve the model for each case separately, and then to find out when each case 
occurs. 
 
3b1. Case 1:Only country 1 specializes 
In this case, for producers in country 2 to be maximizing profits at an interior point in 
() 22 , AB YY   space, the terms of trade must equal country 2’s transformation rate: 
/ BA p λλ λλ λλ λλ = .           ( 1 )  
 
Due to zero profits,  11 1 AS pp ==  (note that zero profit conditions for a country only 
apply to goods that are actually produced in that country), and, by (1),  1 / BA B p λλ λλ λλ λλ = . 
Due to the Cobb-Douglas utility specification, α α α α ,  β β β β , and 1 α β α β α β α β −− are the budget 
shares of each good in each country. Hence 
11 ;/   AB B A cc α βλλ α βλλ α βλλ α βλλ == . 
 
Letting E denote the exchange rate, i.e. the price of country 1’s currency in terms of 
country 2’s currency, price equalization of tradables requires  22 ;/   AB A B pE pE λλ λλ λλ λλ == ; 
and, due to zero profits,  22 /, ,   jj p wj A B λ λ λ λ == ; hence  22 SA p wE λ λ λ λ == . Having found 
consumer prices and per capita income, it follows that per capita consumption levels 
in country 2 are  22 ;  AA BB cc αλ βλ αλ βλ αλ βλ αλ βλ == .  13
 
3b2. Case 2: Only country 2 specializes 
Except for country-1-based normalizations, this case is symmetrical to case 1. Due to 
zero profits,  111 1 ABS ppp ===  and  22 AB p pE == . Again by zero profits, 
22 SB p wE λ λ λ λ == . Based on these prices and wages, per capita consumption levels are  
11 ;;   AB cc α β α β α β α β ==   22 ;  AB BB cc αλ βλ αλ βλ αλ βλ αλ βλ == . 
 
3b3. Case 3: Both countries specialize 
Due to zero profits,  11 1 AS pp ==  (thus  2A p E = ) and  22 / BB pw λ λ λ λ = . It follows that 
11 2 ;;    AB B B cc p c α ββ λ α ββ λ α ββ λ α ββ λ == = . Furthermore, Cobb-Douglas utility dictates that 
22 / AB ccp α β α β α β α β = ; hence  2 / AB cp αλ αλ αλ αλ = . For producers in both countries to be 
maximizing profits, we must have the terms of trade lie between both transformation 
rates: 
1/ BA p λλ λλ λλ λλ ≤≤ .        ( 2 )  
To solve this case, we need to find the equilibrium p. Let  ij i ij CL c =  denote country i’s 
total consumption of good j and  ij X   its quantity of exports. Country 2 employs 
22 22 2 BS S L LL LC =− =−  workers in the production of good B, which therefore equals 
() 22 2 BB S YL C λ λ λ λ =−. Similarly,  11 1 AS YL C =− . Trade equilibrium requires 
11 12 AA BB p Xp X = ; thus  () ( ) () 111 1 1 2 2 2 AA S B B S B pLC C p LC C λ λ λ λ −− = − − . Rearranging, 
we have  () ( ) ( ) () 11 2 1 2 2 1/ 1 AS B S B p cc L L c c λ λ λ λ −− = − − . Now substitute the per capita 
consumption values, and combine with (2), to obtain (defining the key variable φ φ φ φ  in 
the process):  14
Necessary condition for case 3: 
2
1







λ λ λ λ α α α α
λφ λφ λφ λφ
β λ β λ β λ β λ
 
≤= ≡≤  
 
.   (3) 
This yields the remaining price and consumption solutions. Prices for good B are 
12 1/ ; /   BB p pE φφ φφ φφ φφ == . Recalling that  22 / BB pw λ λ λ λ = , we have 
() ( ) 22 1 2 // S pw E L L β α β α β α β α == . Plugging (3) into the consumption expressions that 
have p in them, we have  () 12 1 / BB cL L αλ αλ αλ αλ =  and  21 2 / A cL L β β β β = . 
 
3c. The baseline model’s solution 
In cases 1 and 2, the output of tradables by the non-specializing country is determined 
by the specializing country’s demand and supply conditions. The key feasibility 
conditions here are: 
Case 1:  12 2 22 ()   BB B SB CX L CC λ λ λ λ =< −−   and     (4) 
Case 2:  211 1 1   AA S A CXL C C =< − −       ( 5 )  
 
These inequalities are strict for the following reason. Take, for example, inequality 
(4). If country 2’s production capacity in good B (taking into account domestic 
consumption of services),  22 () BS LC λ λ λ λ − , were to be exhausted, then we would no 
longer have case 1, because country 2 would be specializing in good B. 
 
Now divide both sides of inequality (4) by  1 L   and substitute the per capita 
consumption solutions to obtain 









λ λ λ λ α α α α
λφ λφ λφ λφ




   (6) 
Similarly, we obtain:  15
Necessary condition for case 2:  1   φ φ φ φ < .     (7) 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The baseline model has a unique equilibrium (i.e. unique 
equilibrium values for all endogenous prices and quantities) for all values of 
() 0, i L ∈∞ ;  () ,0 , 1 αβ αβ αβ αβ ∈ , where  1 α β α β α β α β +< ; and  () 0, j λ λ λ λ ∈∞ . 
    SKETCH  of  PROOF: Individual optimality of solutions for consumers and 
producers has been demonstrated. Production and consumption feasibility and 
equilibria in all markets for those solutions are easily verified. Uniqueness is proven 
by (3), (6), and (7), which are mutually exclusive, and are (by optimality, market 
equilibria, and feasibility) not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for each of 
the respective cases to occur. 
 
3d. International comparisons in the baseline model 
3d1. Comparisons of true incomes 
As pointed out by DA (p.5), cardinality in welfare comparisons is achieved by the 















≡ ,         ( 8 )  
which normally requires specification of a reference price vector, pr . However, in the 
special case of a utility function which is homogeneous of degree one – as in our 
model – the Allen index is independent of the reference price vector and is equal to 
the ratio of utilities: 
2:1
21 / AU U = .          ( 9 )  
  16
The Allen index thus provides, in this case, a unique measure of the true per capita 
income ratio between country 2 and country 1. Evaluating utilities for the per capita 
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λλ λλ λλ λλ
α α α α
λ φ λλ λ φ λλ λ φ λλ λ φ λλ
β β β β
> 
  ≡∈  
 < 
.   (10) 
In words, the true income ratio depends on country 2’s absolute advantage in good A 
in case 1; on its absolute advantage in good B in case 2; and depends on relative 
factor scarcity and consumer preferences for outputs in case 3. Remarkably, in case 3, 
the precise magnitude of the true income ratio is independent of the countries’ relative 
productivity. Still, we do know that it must be greater than one. Due to the bounds on 
φ φ φ φ  that are necessary and sufficient for this case to occur, in this case (as in both other 
cases) true income is higher in country 2: 
 
Corollary of PROPOSITION 2: The country with absolute advantage in both 
tradables has higher per capita real income. 
    PROOF: Follows from  1 A λ λ λ λ >  and  1 B λ λ λ λ >  in all three cases. 
  
2d2. Foreign Exchange Rate comparisons of incomes 
As in DA (p.5), “in this model, per capita National Income and Gross Domestic 
Product are identical and, measured in local currencies, are simply equal to the wage. 
So the GDP or income ratio that is obtained from exchange rate comparison is simply  17
the ratio of wage levels expressed in a common currency.” Hence we obtain the 








λ λ λ λ
β β β β
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  == 
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 







λλ λλ λλ λλ




.    (11) 
It follows that, regardless of which case obtains, FX-based relative income is the same 
log-linear function of true relative income, and thus consistently biased upwards. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Non-Traded Sector Bias in FX comparisons
7 
(i) Market exchange rates overstate true international income differentials. 
(ii) The magnitude of this bias is an increasing function of the true income differential 
(or, alternatively, of the FX-based differential) and the domestic expenditure share of 
the non-traded sector. 
    PROOF: Follows from (10) and (11), recalling that the expenditure share of 
nontradables in either country is 01 1 α β α β α β α β <− − <, and noting that by the Corollary of 
Proposition 2, 








αβ αβ αβ αβ
αβ αβ αβ αβ
αβ αβ αβ αβ
−−
−−
+ == > .      ( 1 2 )  
 
This positive bias is due to the fact that FX-based income measures do not take into 
account the prices actually faced by consumers. While prices of tradables are being 
equalized, the price of nontradables is relatively lower in the low-productivity country 
– an effect not captured by the FX measure. 
 
                                                 
7 This proposition and its phrasing follow closely Proposition 2 (DA, p.6). However, note the 
difference in part (ii).  18
PROPOSITION 4: The relative price of nontradables is higher in country 2 than in 
country 1; the entire FX bias is attributable to this fact. 
    Proof: The price ratio of nontradables to tradable good j in country i is  / iS ij p p . 












2:1 1 FX >  (from Proposition 3) proves the first part of Proposition 4; the 
second part follows from 
2:1 FX  being equal to the ratio of relative domestic prices. 
Note that since this ratio is independent of  , jA B = , this result holds no matter which 
price index is chosen for tradables. 
 
3d3. Purchasing Power Parity comparisons of incomes
8 
Next, we turn to the measurement of the international income ratio by the Geary-
Khamis (GK) method of calculating purchasing power parity. This method values 
each country’s GDP at ‘international prices’. Applied to the present model, this 
method requires specification of one scalar element of the international price vector 
only. As the price ratio of tradables, p, is equal for both countries, it does not matter 
which country we use for the prices of tradables; thus we need to introduce only one 
additional variable: the international price of nontradables, g (which can of course be 
scaled up or down by E). We represent the GK price vector as: 
()[] 11 ,, P
GK
AB g gp p ≡ .        ( 1 3 )  
The Geary-Khamis measure of real GDP per capita for country i is the per capita 
consumption bundle evaluated at international prices. Evaluating the consumption 
                                                 
8 The wording of some passages of this paragraph follows closely that of the corresponding paragraph 
in DA (p.6-7).  19
bundles derived above at international prices, the GK income ratio between countries 










GK g g FX
GK g
GK g g
αβ αβ αβ αβ αβ αβ αβ αβ




.  (14) 
 
Remarkably, (14) holds for each of our three cases, as can be verified with equation 
(11) – even though in each case 
2:1 FX  depends on different parameters. Whether the 
Geary-Khamis comparison under- or over-states the true income ratio depends on the 
value of g. We summarize the relationship in Proposition 5, which is analogous to 
Proposition 3 of DA (p.7): 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Substitution bias in Geary-Khamis comparisons 
(i) A bilateral international comparison of per capita income which value expenditure 
at constant prices will understate the true income differential if the constant price 
vector corresponds to that of the high-productivity country, or the prices of an even 
richer country. 
(ii) A constant price comparison will overstate the true income differential if the 
constant price vector corresponds to that of the low-productivity country, or the prices 
of an even poorer country. 
(iii) The bias is greater, the less similar is the reference price vector with respect to the 
comparison country prices. 
(iv) Where (i) or (ii) holds, the magnitude of the bias is an increasing function of the 
income differential (whether measured through FX or by true income) between the 
two countries.  20
    PROOF: Letting  1 γ α β γ α β γ α β γ α β ≡− −  and noting again that 
2:1 1 FX > , it can be verified 
that (14) is equivalent to equation (14) of DA. Thus, their proof applies. 
 
4. Extensions of the baseline model 
 
Most of the assumptions in this part are the same as our baseline model. However, we 
extend the model by assuming the two countries become small open economies, 
trading in a global market under world prices. Besides, since we aim to endogenize 
the BS effect, the production functions for two countries become  
11 AA YL = , 11 BB YL = , 11 SS YL = , 
22 AA A Ya L λ = , 22 BB B Ya L λ = , 22 SS Ya L = , () 1/ ; 1 BA aa >> > λλ , 
where  ij L  and  ij Y   respectively denote labor input and output of good j in country i, 
and  A λ , B λ  and  a   are fixed labor productivity coefficients. This implies that it is 
uncertain which country has the higher price level because this depends on which 
sector has the larger productivity gap. In other words, the positive BS effect is not 
guaranteed to exist. We further introduce distribution costs by assuming that 
consuming a unit of good A and B requires  A φ  and  B φ units of untradable distribution 
services respectively in country 1, and  / A a φ and / B a φ units in country 2, because the 
service productivity is atimes as high as that in country 1. Without loss of generality, 
we assume that good S does not require distribution services. It is also assumed that 
labor cannot move between countries but is perfectly mobile between local sectors. 
Thus, the wage rate in different sectors of a country is equal, while it is unequal across 
countries. Two countries trade in a world market under exogenous world prices 
nominated by a world currency. PPP is assumed to hold for tradable goods at  21
producer level.  i E denotes the world market exchange rate between the currency of 
country i and the world currency, which is defined as the price of country i’s currency 
in terms of the world currency. Let  ij p  and  ij p  denote the producers price and retail 
price for tradable goods respectively, p   denote the terms of trade in the world 
market, implying 1 unit good A changes for p  units B, and
i w  denote the nominal 
wage rate in country i. Without loss of generality again, let 1 1 A p = . When individuals 
face different terms of trade in the world market, competitive equilibrium results in 
one of five different trade patterns: 
Case 1: if 1<p</ BA λλ , country 1 specializes in A and country 2 specializes in B; 
Case 2: if p<1, both countries specialize in B; 
Case 3: if p>/ BA λλ , both countries specialize in A; 
Case 4: if p=1, country 1 produces both goods while country 2 specializes in B; 
Case 5: if p=/ BA λλ , country 1 specializes in A while country 2 produces both goods.  
 
Let us discuss case 1 first. In this case, since there is no profit for the producer and 
PPP is assumed to hold at the producer level, we obtain  
1 1 A p = ,  1 1/ B p p = , 21 2 / A p EE = , 21 2 / B p EE p = . 
The retail prices are given by: 
11 1 AA p wφ =+ ,  11 1/ BB p pw φ =+, 21 2 2 // AA p EE w a φ =+ ,  21 22 // BB p EE pw a φ =+. 
Since  1 1 w = and 21 2 / B wa E E p λ = , then  
1 1 AA p φ =+ ,  1 1/ BB pp φ =+ , 11 1 S pw == ; 
21 2 1 2 // AB A p EE EE p λφ =+ ,  21 2 1 2 // BB B p EE p EE p λφ =+ ,  22 1 2 // SB p wa EE p λ == .  22
It is obvious that PPP does not typically hold for retail prices and it is uncertain which 
country has more expensive untradable services. 
The Cobb-Douglas preferences imply thatα ,β  and γ  always represent the share of 
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,  2S ca γ = , 
where p is exogenous. 
 
Similarly, we obtain solutions for the other cases. The results are as follows. 
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()( ) ( ) ,
1/ 1 / /
1/ 1 / /
() ( ) ,
1/ 1 / /
11 /























































































.                    (15) 
 
Since  1 > > A B λ λ and  1 > a , it is straightforward to prove that
1 : 2 A is larger than 1. 
This result is not surprising because it just verifies that the country with higher 
productivity will be wealthier. What is of significance is that we can next ascertain the 
relationship between international comparisons of FX income, GK income and true 
(Afriat) income. 
 
4a. Foreign exchange rate comparisons of incomes 
As in Dowrick and Akmal (2003), per capita national income and GDP are assumed 
to be identical and equal to the wage rate. Therefore, the FX-based per capita income 































.                                                                    (16) 
PROPOSITION 6: Market exchange rate comparisons will overstate true 
international income gaps if and only if the price level of services is higher in the 
relatively rich country. 
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 > 1S p , as 
was to be shown. 
 
This proposition generalizes the results from Dowrick and Akmal (2003) and the 
baseline model. In particular, if the non-traded labor services are assumed to be more 
expensive in the rich country, our result coincides with theirs. Moreover, this result 
may help improve measures of national income for non-benchmark countries: 
variables such as productivity for untradable goods and the terms of trade should be  25
included as explanatory variables in the regression equation. This will be shown in 
part 4. 
 
4b. Purchasing-Power-Parity comparisons of incomes 
Next, we turn to Purchasing-Power-Parity-based income comparisons. The Geary-
Khamis (G-K) method is used by ICP (1987) to aggregate the quantities under 
constant international prices, which are calculated as weighted arithmetic averages of 
prices prevailing in the system. Therefore, in our model, the per capita GK income 














where  i p  denotes the constant international price for good i. 
 
PROPOSITION 7: Constant price comparisons will overstate true international 
income gaps if the constant price vector corresponds to that of a country where the 
productivity is lower (the poor country) and understate true international income gaps 
if the constant price vector corresponds to that of a country where the productivity is 
higher (the rich country), regardless of the service price relationship between these 
two countries. 
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 and / B p z λ = . 
We just need to show thatx yz x y z
αβ γ α βγ <++. Since x yz ==does not hold, we 
can obtain the result simply from Jensen’s inequality.
9 
Suppose country 1’s prices are used, then 
2:1
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Correspondingly, the same conclusion can be derived for the other cases (see the 
appendix). 
 
This proposition is consistent with the one suggested by Dowrick and Akmal (2003) 
and our baseline model if it is assumed that nontraded labor services are more 
expensive in the rich country. However, when the BS effect is endogenized, our 
extensions are significant. We found that the relationship between GK income and 
true income only depends on the productivity of the country of which the price vector 
is used as the constant price vector, while it does not depend on whether the higher 
price vector or the lower one is used. Accordingly, it is possible that even if the 
relatively low price vector is chosen as the constant one, the true national income gaps 
will be underestimated as long as it occurs in the country with higher productivity. 
This outcome is opposite to the one in the previous literature. 
 
5. Empirical result 
 
As mentioned in the earlier sections, Afriat income could be calculated only for the 
countries included in ICP surveys, while a lot of countries did not participate in the 
program. For that reason, we have to predict true income for non-benchmark countries. 
Dowrick and Akmal (2003) suggest a regression model with a log-linear relationship 
between True income and FX income. Inspired by their work, the theoretical model 
explored in the present paper implies that the regression could be improved by 
augmenting the number of variables. From equation (15) and (16), if we just ignore  28
the influence of distribution costs for the moment, and normalise true income per 
capita in country 1 to unity, the equation could be stated as 
)) ln( ) )(ln( ( ) ln( ) ln(
i i i i a FX a A − + = − β α . 
Our regression model is based on this equation. We select the cross-country data for 
the year 1980. The source of FX income (GDP per capita) data is “World Bank 
Global Development Network Growth Database”, and Afriat income is directly taken 
from Dowrick and Quiggin (1997). Since Afriat incomes have been normalised in 
their paper, we need to add an intercept term in our regression. Thus, the regression 
model could be specified as 
ln( ) ln( ) ( )(ln( ) ln( ))
ii ii Aa c F Xa αβ −= + + −
10,  
where c is a constant. There are no direct data on Labor productivity for untradable 
goods ) (
i a . Hence, it is calculated as value added (volume) for the total service 
industry, divided by total employment in this sector, the data of which are presented 
in “The OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis”. We plot the data of 
) ln( ) ln(
i i a A − against ) ln( ) ln(
i i a FX − in Figure 1, which clearly displays the log-
linear relationship. Although the available sample size is small, including only 12 
countries, the regression is still run applying OLS and the results are reported in the 
table 1. 
 
                                                    Figure 1 
                                 ) ln( ) ln(
i i a A − against ) ln( ) ln(
i i a FX − ,1980 
                           actual and predicted values for 12 OECD countries 
                                                 






























                                                                   
                                                    Table 1 
The dependent variable is  ) ln( ) ln(
i i a A − . 
R-Squared 0.967081
Adjusted R-Squared  0.963789
Standard Error  0.153931
Sample size  12
 
We find that the term of  ) ln( ) ln(
i i a FX −  is highly significant – as expected – and the 
value of the coefficient fits our theoretical model. Dowrick and Akmal’s (2003) result 
is broadly similar, although they suggest that the coefficient should be between 0.6 
and 0.8. It is also found that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 5% 
level by one-tailed test, which confirms that FX income is biased. Nevertheless, there 
are several problems which merit our attention because they may affect the estimation 
results. Firstly, the sample size is too small to satisfy the requirement for a regression. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, Afriat incomes have been normalized, which might 
 Coefficients  Standard 
Error
t stat p > |t| Lower 95%  Upper 95%
Intercept: c  -7.429845  0.921119 -8.06611 0.000000 -9.235205  -5.624486
) ln( ) ln(
i i a FX − : β α +   0.884564 0.063584 13.91163 0.000000 0.759940  1.009187 30
lead to a biased estimation especially since the sample size is small. Moreover, all 
observations in the sample involve OECD countries; thus the basic assumption of the 
theoretical model that labor cannot move between countries may be violated. 
 
6. Conclusion and further research 
 
The main point of the present paper is not the demonstration that true relative income 
is a function of foreign-exchange based relative income, as this merely confirms DA’s 
result. The main contribution of our baseline model is, instead, the result that this 
function holds regardless of the relative importance of income determinants. Whether 
it is factor productivity, input scarcity, or demand for outputs that determine income 
differentials, the same functional relationship between the FX income ratio and the 
true income ratio holds. This insight strengthens the case for empirical estimation of 
the relationship between FX income and Afriat income for benchmark year-country 
combinations, in order to estimate Afriat income for non-benchmark years/countries. 
The result may be improved measurement of national incomes for non-benchmark 
years/countries. 
 
We incorporated some extensions to make the model more general and more realistic. 
Some results from the existing literature are confirmed. However, using several new 
assumptions, we derive some more general propositions, which are not entirely 
consistent with the traditional ones. For example, by endogenizing the BS effect, we 
show that the rich country could have a lower price level. If this case really occurs, 
the relationship between FX income, GK income and true (Afriat) income will be 
different from the results obtained from previous studies. 
  31
In addition, based on our theoretical foundations, regression used to predict true 
income for non-benchmark countries is improved by adding a variable. Although the 
sample size is unsatisfactory, the approach taken and the results should be acceptable. 
We look ahead to replicating this analysis using a better data set. 
 
Future work can follow the direction taken in the present paper. Estimation of Afriat 
income can be improved by further generalizing the theoretical foundations. The 
following aspects may be worth considering in further research. Firstly, multi-factor 
production functions with a continuum of differentiated goods in a monopolistically 
competitive market could be analysed. Secondly, the two-country model could be 
extended to an n-country model. Thirdly, we can endogenize tradability by 
introducing trade barriers. For example, if the comparative advantage of producing a 
good is so great that it can cover the total cost including costs attributed to trade 
barriers, it becomes tradable, while others remain untradable. Fourth, while DA obtain 
a log-linear empirical relationship between Afriat income and FX income, they do not 
take into account off-equilibrium movements in exchange rates. Their method could 
be improved by finding a way to smooth time series of exchange rates. Moreover, DA 
and this paper do not consider financial markets. These may need to be considered, 
because financial variables affect both exchange rates (used for computing FX 
income) and prices (used for computing the GK-PPP and Afriat measures). A 
dynamic model could explore this in further detail. 
 
Another promising question for future research is how to appropriately estimate 
national incomes and living standards. In fact, even if the Afriat index is an unbiased 
estimate of GDP per capita, could it really measure proper “well-being” or, perhaps  32
more to the point, “economic well-being” of a country? Firstly, environment and 
natural resource depletion and degradation are ignored when national income is 
measured, so apparent economic growth may in fact be unsustainable and hence 
illusory. Secondly, national income accounts ignore nonmarket output, which includes 
in particular household activity. Thirdly, informal and illegal transactions are not 
adequately reflected in official GDP. In addition, national income should not be the 
sole measure of living standards. Other social indicators, like life expectancy, literacy 
rates and distribution of individual welfare should be incorporated in the analysis of 
well-being.   
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PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 7 IN THE OTHER FOUR CASES 
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In case 3, 
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On the other hand,  
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In case 4,  
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In case 5,  
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